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Post-Brexit	UK	trade	policy	remains	a	wish	list
About	half	of	UK’s	trade	and	investment	is	with	the	EU	and,	as	a	member	of	the	single	market,
the	UK	implements	similar	standards	for	products	and	services	as	the	EU.	Furthermore,	as	a
member	of	the	customs	union,	the	UK	operates	a	common	external	tariff,	and	goods	and	services
can	move	seamlessly	with	no	customs	or	compliance	checks.	How	the	UK	exits	the	EU	will,
therefore,	have	profound	impacts	on	trade,	investment	and	economic	growth	in	the	UK,
write	Nikhil	Datta	and	Swati	Dhingra	(LSE’s	Centre	for	Economic	Performance).
The	government	white	papers	have	made	clear	the	intention	of	the	UK	to	establish	its	own	trading	schedules
(import	tariffs	and	quotas)	at	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	replicating	the	existing	EU	tariffs	as	much	as
possible.
Such	a	move	would	inevitably	mean	that	the	UK	leaves	the	EU’s	customs	union,	which	in	turn	means	goods	from
the	UK	exported	to	the	EU,	and	vice	versa,	would	face	‘rules	of	origin’	checks	at	the	border.	These	checks	ensure
the	goods	are	produced	in	the	exporting	country,	and	are	not	simply	being	re-routed	from	another	country	that	is
subject	to	higher	tariffs.
But	the	problem	with	these	checks	is	that	they	are	time-consuming,	and	estimated	to	cost	about	8%	of	the	value
of	the	good.	It	is	these	sorts	of	issues	which	ranked	Norway	(a	member	of	the	single	market	but	not	the	customs
union)	as	the	most	problematic	trading	partner	for	Swedish	businesses	in	a	survey	by	the	Swedish	National
Board	of	trade:	one	of	the	most	common	complaints	of	trading	with	Norway	was	the	“incredibly	cumbersome”
customs	handling	and	rules.	Other	procedures,	such	as	custom	searches	and	filling	declarations	and	risks	of
delays	at	ports,	are	concerns	voiced	by	stakeholders.
The	latter	of	these	is	of	particular	importance	to	industries	relying	on	fresh	produce	or	operating	just-in-time
production	lines	such	as	the	automotive	industry.	Major	disruption	to	their	production	lines	could	occur	if	customs
procedures	are	not	as	smooth	as	they	have	been	previously.	It	is,	therefore,	promising	that	in	both	the	white
paper	and	the	future	partnership	paper	the	government	has	given	attention	to	the	future	customs	arrangement
between	the	UK	and	the	EU,	and	has	proposed	two	possible	arrangements.
One	–	a	“highly	streamlined	customs	arrangement”	–	would	seek	the	implementation	of	a	technological	solution
for	fast	movements	through	roll-on,	roll-off	ports,	and	would	attempt	to	negotiate	a	waiver	for	declarations.	The
other	–	a	new	customs	partnership	agreement	–	would	involve	mimicking	the	EU	customs	arrangement
specifically	for	goods	to	be	consumed	in	the	EU.	However,	the	former	would	most	likely	require	a	large	amount	of
infrastructure	spending,	while	not	mitigating	all	costs,	and	the	latter	would	need	some	form	of	enforcement
mechanism.
Unfortunately,	little	information	has	been	offered	on	the	detail	and	implementation	of	such	arrangements.	Given
these	have	not	been	attempted	before,	it	is	such	details	which	are	arguably	the	most	important.	However,	it	is
almost	certain	that,	outside	the	customs	union,	HMRC	will	need	to	expand	to	ensure	it	has	both
the	personnel	and	the	infrastructure	to	handle	the	increased	workload.
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Deep	trade	deals,	which	increase	trade	volumes,	go	beyond	tariffs	and	customs	issues.	They	aim	to	reduce	the
divergences	in	standards	and	regulation	between	countries	so	that	businesses	face	lower	costs	of	compliance
and	operation	across	borders.	This	is	what	turns	a	free	trade	area	into	one	large	single	market.	By	following	a
common	standard,	or	at	least	having	mutual	recognition	of	standards,	products	do	not	need	to	be	certified	to	mark
that	they	meet	domestic	requirements.
It	would	be	hoped	the	UK	could	make	a	mutual	recognition	agreement	with	the	EU,	covering	items	such	as
electrical	goods	and	machinery,	similar	to	those	struck	with	countries	such	as	Australia	and	Canada.	The	larger
issue,	however,	concerns	the	services	sector,	which	makes	up	80%	of	the	UK	economy.	For	example,	the	loss	of
financial	passporting	rights	(which	allow	UK	based	financial	institutions	to	do	business	across	the	EU)	could	have
major	implications	for	the	financial	sector.	Even	if	some	sort	of	regulatory	equivalence	was	recognised,	this	is
unlikely	to	cover	commercial	banking	or	primary	insurance,	as	not	all	EU	financial	regulations	currently	offer	the
possibility	of	equivalence.
Access	to	the	single	EU	aviation	market	could	be	disrupted	because	current	rules	require	headquarters	to	be
located	within	the	EU.	This	is	the	main	factor	behind	EasyJet	setting	up	their	Austrian	HQ.	Estimates	suggest	that
non-tariff	barriers	in	services	have	an	ad	valorem	equivalent	of	8.5%	to	47.3%	between	the	EU	and	US.	Outside
of	the	EU,	the	UK	could	face	a	proportion	of	these	costs,	and	that	proportion	would	rise	as	standards	diverge
between	the	two	areas.
Out	of	the	EU,	the	UK	might	find	it	easier	to	strike	bilateral	agreements	with	new	trade	partners,	because	it	would
no	longer	face	the	constraints	imposed	by	27	other	members.	As	a	smaller	economy	though,	the	UK	would	also
lose	bargaining	power,	which	matters	significantly	in	trade	negotiations.	This	was	Switzerland’s	experience	when
striking	its	trade	deal	with	China	(a	proposed	FTA	partner	for	the	UK):	as	noted	by	the	Lalive	Report,	the	“FTA	is
more	favourable	to	Chinese	exports”.	A	survey	by	the	Swiss	Chamber	of	Commerce	further	noted	that	“the	FTA	is
not	very	attractive”,	while	the	Swiss	Embassy	has	noted	that	service	exports	from	Switzerland	to	China	haven’t
grown	as	a	result	of	the	FTA.
Another	difficulty	that	the	UK	will	face	when	negotiating	with	its	large	trade	partners	–	the	US,	China	and	India	–	is
that	its	regulatory	framework	is	substantively	different	from	these	countries.	Thus	striking	deep	deals,	which
achieve	regulatory	harmonisation	without	compromising	domestic	standards,	would	be	difficult	in	future
negotiations	with	these	non-EU	trade	partners.	The	goals	set	out	in	the	Department	for	International	Trade’s	most
recent	policy	paper	are	ambitious.	As	negotiating	deep	trade	deals	can	be	a	lengthy	process,	this	is	a	long-term
strategy	for	trade	policy	and	is	unlikely	to	cushion	immediate	drops	in	trade	volumes	under	plausible	scenarios,
like	a	no-deal	Brexit	in	which	tariffs	would	apply	right	away.
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The	goal	outlined	by	the	government	to	achieve	a	transition	agreement,	which	will	maintain	current	market	access
and	customs	arrangements	with	the	EU,	is	therefore	a	step	in	the	right	direction.	It	will	avoid	a	cliff	edge	in
eighteen	months,	and	buy	the	government	time	to	negotiate	its	future	terms	with	the	EU.	Ultimately	though,	a
transition	arrangement	will	need	to	give	way	to	a	new	arrangement	with	the	EU.	The	government	papers	give	no
details	of	the	specific	set	of	policies	that	will	be	put	in	place	to	achieve	the	stated	ambition	of	frictionless	trade
with	the	EU.	Without	these	workable	details,	UK	trade	policy	remains	a	wish	list.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	of	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	on
the	UKinEU	blog.
Nikhil	Datta	is	a	Research	Assistant	at	the	LSE’s	Centre	for	Economic	Performance
Dr	Swati	Dhingra	is	a	Research	Leader	at	The	UK	in	a	Changing	Europe,	and	an	Assistant	Professor	in
Economics	at	the	LSE
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